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entrusted to small teams instead of individuals. Yet the effect of team decision-making in a market environment 
has never been studied in a controlled experiment. In this paper, we investigate the effect of team decision-
making in an asset market experiment that has long been known to reliably generate price bubbles and crashes in 
markets populated by individuals. We find that this tendency is substantially reduced when each decision-
making unit is instead a team of two. This holds across a broad spectrum of measures of the severity of 
mispricing, both under a continuous double-auction institution and in a call market. The result is not driven by 
reduced turnover due to time required for deliberation by teams, and continues to hold even when subjects are 
experienced. Our result also holds not only when our teams treatments are compared to the ‘narrow’ baseline 
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1 Introduction 
Many important decisions in both business and government – including funds management 
(Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi 2011) and monetary policy (Blinder and Morgan 2005) – are 
increasingly being entrusted to small groups as opposed to individuals. Yet, with the 
exception of the fields of public choice and organization theory, economics has remained 
largely silent on the question of group decision-making, treating the decisions of households 
and firms as though they were made by unitary decision-makers. In this paper we examine the 
effect of team decision-making upon the propensity for asset markets to bubble and crash. We 
make this comparison in the setting of an experiment, in which the intrinsic value of the asset 
that is bought and sold – as well as other features such as the size of the decision-making unit 
– is under the control of the experimenter. Our experiments thus isolate the effect of team 
decision-making, holding other features of the market environment constant. 
Our paper sets out to make two distinct contributions. Firstly, we contribute to experimental 
research on teams by reporting, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to compare the 
behavior of individuals and teams in a fully-fledged double-sided market environment. We 
make this comparison using both a continuous double-auction institution and a call market 
institution, in the setting of a market for a long-lived asset. Secondly, whereas almost all 
existing research on asset market experiments has examined the robustness of bubbles and 
crashes to institutional features of the market environment, our focus in this paper is on the 
characteristics of the traders themselves, in particular the effect of populating a market with 
teams of size two instead of individuals. Across a broad range of measures of the severity of 
mispricing, we find strong support for the proposition that team decision-making results in 
substantially smaller price bubbles when compared to baseline markets populated by individ-
uals drawn from the same subject pool and using the same procedures. This is the case in both 
our double-auction and call market treatments. This is also the case when we compare our 
teams markets to a broader database of results from previous research on markets of this type. 
2. Related literature 
2.1 Decision-making by individuals and teams 
To date, the limited economic literature on team decision-making can be divided into studies 
of preferences or decision-making in non-strategic settings, and studies involving strategic 
games. Studies of non-strategic environments are dominated by experiments on decision-
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making under risk. Baker, Laury and Williams (2008) and Shupp and Williams (2008) 
compare experimentally-elicited measures of risk preferences between individuals and teams 
of size three. Baker, Laury and Williams do this using the paired lottery choice procedure of 
Holt and Laury (2002). Shupp and Williams elicit certainty equivalents for lotteries with 
different probabilities of winning, using a procedure based upon Kachelmeier and Shehata 
(1992). Baker, Laury and Williams find no significant difference between the risk preferences 
of individuals and teams, while Shupp and Williams find that teams are significantly more 
risk averse when the probability of winning is low, but less risk averse when it is high. 
Bone, Hey and Suckling (1999) and Rockenbach, Sadrieh and Mathauschek (2007) examine 
whether teams (of size two and three, respectively) are more or less likely than individuals to 
exhibit violations of expected utility theory such as the common ratio effect. Both papers 
report almost no difference; however Rockenbach, Sadrieh and Mathauschek observe that 
teams accumulate significantly more expected value than individuals, and at a significantly 
lower risk, a result they attribute to teams’ avoidance of excess risk. Charness, Karni and 
Levin (2007) study violations of first-order stochastic dominance and Bayes’ rule by 
individuals and teams. They find that teams commit fewer violations than individuals, and 
that the incidence of violations further decreases as team size increases from two to three. 
Blinder and Morgan (2005) study two experiments designed to test the hypothesis that teams 
make decisions more slowly than individuals. They find no significant difference between 
individuals and teams of size five in the amount of data that is accumulated before a decision 
is made, but report that teams make significantly better decisions. 
Turning to studies of strategic interaction, Kocher and Sutter (2005) find no difference 
between the decisions of individuals and teams of three in the first round of a beauty-contest 
experiment. However as the game is repeated, teams converge significantly faster toward the 
game-theoretic equilibrium, indicating that teams learn faster than individuals. Cooper and 
Kagel (2005) compare individuals to teams of two in three entry-deterrence signaling games. 
They find that teams learn strategic play more rapidly than individuals in all three treatments, 
and that teams’ superior performance increases with the difficulty of the games. 
We are also aware of studies that experimentally examine bidding behavior by teams. Cox 
and Hayne (2006) compare individuals to teams of five in common-value auctions in which 
the number of bidders is either three or seven. When both individuals and teams receive a 
single signal of value, they find no evidence that the winning bids of teams are either more or 
less rational than those of individuals. However, when each member of a team receives their 
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own signal, they find that winning teams bid less rationally than individuals, in that they fail 
to discount their bids sufficiently to avoid the winner’s curse. Casari, Zhang and Jackson 
(2010) study bidding by individuals and teams of size three in the company takeover game of 
Bazerman and Samuelson (1985), in which there is only a single buyer and a robot seller. 
They report that teams make significantly fewer winner’s curse offers because they learn 
faster and because 75% of team decisions coincide with the choice of the median member, in 
a task in which the majority of subjects make the correct decision when deciding in isolation. 
Finally, there are some empirical studies that are pertinent to our research. Bär, Ciccotello and 
Ruenzi (2010) and Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi (2011) analyze data on US mutual funds and find 
that, controlling for differences in size, age and other characteristics, team-managed funds 
take on less risk than individually-managed funds, and adjust their risk profile less in response 
to prior performance. Team-managed funds follow an investment style that is less extreme 
and more consistent over time. Bliss, Potter and Schwartz (2008) similarly find that team-
managed funds take on less risk, and that they have lower expenses than individually-
managed funds. However, an inherent difficulty with this type of research is that since the 
intrinsic value of funds’ assets is unobservable, it is not possible to evaluate the effect of team 
management upon the overall performance of the market as a whole. 
2.2 Price bubbles in experimental asset markets 
The second body of literature to which we seek to contribute relates to experimental asset 
markets. The tendency for such markets to bubble and crash, even when the dividend process 
is common knowledge, was first documented by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988), 
hereinafter SSW. They found that with inexperienced subjects, prices follow a consistent 
pattern of starting out below intrinsic value before rising steeply above it and then crashing. 
An extensive body of subsequent research has shown that this pattern is robust to numerous 
extensions and modifications to SSW’s original design. However we are aware of only three 
studies that consider the effect of trader characteristics upon the bubble-and-crash 
phenomenon. SSW populate one of their markets (Experiment 10) with professional and 
business people from Tucson. They conclude from this that their results are not an artifact of 
the use of student subjects. Similarly, King et al (1993) report two markets in which the 
subjects were corporate executives and stock market dealers, respectively. They likewise 
conclude that this did not alter the general pattern of trade typically observed with 
inexperienced student subjects. Finally, Ackert and Church (2001) compared markets 
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populated with business students with markets made up of non-business students. They 
observe the same familiar bubble-and-crash pattern with both inexperienced non-business 
subjects (Markets 1–3) as with inexperienced business subjects (Markets 4–6). 
3. Design and procedures 
We compare the performance of experimental asset markets populated by individuals to ones 
in which each decision-making unit is a team of size two. We make this comparison in both 
continuous double-auction and call market institutions. Our experiments were conducted in 
the CentERlab at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. This facility comprises both a 
conventional laboratory with 24 partitioned workstations (the ‘A Lab’) and ten soundproofed 
cubicles, each large enough to seat two subjects side-by-side in front of the computer (the ‘B 
Lab’).1 All sessions were conducted in English, and all treatments were fully computerized 
and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
The experimental asset has a life of fifteen trading periods, and pays a stochastic dividend to 
its current owner at the end of each period. This dividend may be 0, 8, 28 or 60 units of 
experimental currency (‘francs’) per unit of stock (‘share’), each with equal probability, such 
that the expected dividend is 24 francs in each period. A trader’s holdings of experimental 
money and stock carry over from one trading period to the next. At the conclusion of fifteen 
periods, all shares expire without any terminal value. The intrinsic value of a unit of stock is 
thus 24 multiplied by the number of remaining periods, and in particular it is 360 in the first 
period. The dividend structure of the asset was clearly explained as part of the instructions 
that were read aloud at the start of the experiment, and in addition information on the intrinsic 
value in each period was provided in the form of an average holding value table. 
Each market consists of nine traders. At the beginning of the first trading period, three traders 
are endowed with an initial portfolio of 450 francs and six shares. A further three traders are 
endowed with 1,170 francs and four shares, and the remaining three traders are endowed with 
1,890 francs and two shares. The intrinsic value of each trader’s initial endowment is thus 
identical and equal to 2,610 francs.2  The rules of the market do not allow traders to buy on 
margin or to sell short. Each trader’s earnings from the experiment are derived from the 
                                                 
1  A photo of one of the cubicles in the B Lab is included in the supplementary material. A floor plan of the 
CentERlab can be found online at http://center.uvt.nl/lab/map1.doc. 
2  No trader is aware of the endowments of the other traders. They only know of their own, which they learn of 
at the commencement of the first trading period. 
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amount of experimental money they hold at the end of the fifteenth period, after the dividend 
for that period has been paid. At the conclusion of the experiment, this amount was converted 
into Euros at a fixed and pre-announced exchange rate, and paid to the subjects in cash. 
In each of our teams markets, each of the nine traders was a randomly-matched team of two. 
At the conclusion of the session we paid out the value of a team’s earnings to each of its two 
members, using the same exchange rate as in the corresponding individuals treatment. In other 
words, each team member received the same earnings as they would have had they executed 
the same transactions as individuals in the corresponding individuals treatment (and faced the 
same random realizations of the dividends). Upon completion of the experiment, but prior to 
receiving their payments, all subjects were also asked to complete a post-experiment 
questionnaire. This was completed individually in both the individuals and teams treatments.3 
3.1 Double-auction sessions 
Our individual double-auction data are from the baseline condition in Haruvy, Noussair and 
Powell (2009), hereinafter HNP, who report six baseline markets conducted between 10 
December 2007 and 28 March 2008.4 A total of 51 subjects took part in these markets, since 
not all sessions had the full complement of nine traders. We compare these to six team 
double-auction markets which we conducted under identical parameters using the same 
laboratory and subject pool in Tilburg between 5 and 13 February 2009. We oversubscribed 
our sessions to ensure that there were eighteen subjects (nine teams of two) in each session, 
for a total of 108. We used the same computer program as HNP,5 and paid our subjects using 
the same exchange rate as they used (100 francs to one Euro). Each session ran for an average 
of 2.5 hours, and no individual was allowed to participate in more than one session. Table 1 
provides summary demographic and earnings statistics for each of the treatments, while a 
more detailed subject pool analysis is reported in the supplementary material. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
                                                 
3  Refer to the supplementary material for the post-experiment questionnaire for our teams treatments. In all 
treatments other than the individual double auctions, the questionnaires also included a ten-item test of 
financial literacy derived from van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011). 
4  In addition to their baseline condition, HNP consider additional treatments involving the buyback or float of 
shares. We do not utilise the data from these other treatments in this study. 
5 Refer to the supplementary material for sample screen shots. During the course of a trading period, each 
trader’s screen displayed their current holdings of experimental money and stock, the history of prices in the 
current period, and the open order book of bids and asks. At the conclusion of each period, the screen 
displayed summary information including the dividend realization for the period just ended. 
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After subjects had signed in, we directed them to sit at any available terminal in the A Lab. 
We then distributed and read aloud the first section of the instructions, dealing with the 
mechanics of using the trading interface to post offers and to buy and sell shares.6 These were 
identical to the corresponding instructions used by HNP. Following the same procedure 
adopted by HNP, subjects were then given ten minutes in which to practice trading using the 
interface. They completed this practice period individually, and it did not count toward their 
earnings. It is worth emphasizing that they completed the practice task before they had been 
told about the dividend structure of the asset, how their earnings would be determined, or that 
they would undertake the main part of the experiment in teams. 
We next circulated and read aloud the remaining sections of the instructions, dealing with the 
team nature of the experiment, dividend structure of the asset, average holding value table and 
calculation of earnings. These were adapted from the corresponding instructions from HNP by 
emphasizing that all dividends and cash balances would accrue to both members of each team. 
After the subjects had been assigned into their teams, each team was then escorted to its own 
separate cubicle in the B Lab. When all teams were ready, the doors to the cubicles were 
closed and the experiment commenced.7 In order to facilitate team deliberation, we increased 
the length of each double-auction trading period from four minutes in the HNP baseline 
condition to five minutes in our teams markets. Upon completion of the experiment, the 
subjects returned to their original seats in the A Lab, where they completed a post-experiment 
questionnaire individually. Finally, given that both members of each team received the same 
earnings, we paid them in teams, in privacy from the others, in an adjoining office. 
3.2 Call market sessions 
We ran our call market treatments to address the concern, discussed at length in Section 5.1 
below, that the time required for deliberation by teams might account for the lower turnover 
that we observe in our team double auctions, and this might in turn account for our finding 
that these markets are less prone to bubble.8 For this reason, we did not impose any time 
                                                 
6 The complete text of the instructions for the team double auctions is contained in the supplementary 
material. The same experimenter (Author 1) read out the instructions in all six sessions. 
7 There was a call button in each cubicle, which subjects could use to alert the experimenters in the event of 
any questions or other difficulties. 
8  We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these treatments. This referee also suggested the use of 
recording devices for teams markets. We decided against pursuing this for several reasons. Firstly, the 
experiment was conducted in a non-native language for many of the subjects. Had we attempted to regulate 
the language in which they conversed, this might itself have interfered with the speed and efficacy of their 
deliberations. Moreover, the mere fact that they would have been aware that their conversations were being 
recorded might alone have influenced the nature of their deliberations. Secondly, we lack any comparable 
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constraints upon the submission of limit orders in the call markets, thereby allowing unlimited 
time for deliberation by both individuals and teams. 
Our call market data consist of four individuals sessions and three teams sessions, conducted 
between 21 and 25 March 2011, using the same laboratory and subject pool in Tilburg as the 
double-auction sessions.9 We use a call market institution similar to Haruvy, Lahav and 
Noussair (2007), while retaining the same parameters as the double-auction treatments. In 
each period, each trader submits the maximum quantity of shares they are willing to buy and 
the highest price they are willing to pay, as well as the maximum quantity they are willing to 
sell and the lowest price that they will accept. The period is concluded when all traders have 
submitted their orders. At this point, the computer screen displays summary information 
including the market price and the dividend realization for the period just ended.10 
To preclude the possibility of a selection effect, we recruited subjects for a session with an 
advertised length of 2.5 hours (the same as our team double auctions) in both the individuals 
and teams treatments. Because we did not limit the time for deliberation in call markets, we 
could not be certain in advance how quickly or slowly the session would progress. However, 
we anticipated that it might be possible to complete more than one market repetition within 
the allotted time, and so we adjusted the exchange rate to 260 francs to one Euro. 
As it turns out, in each of our sessions we had sufficient time to conduct at least one 
additional repetition of the market using the same parameters as before. For our call market 
treatments, we are thus able to report results for both inexperienced and once-experienced 
markets.11 In the individuals sessions, the average length of time required to complete two 
market repetitions was 77 minutes, while in the teams sessions it was 147 minutes. We over-
subscribed sessions to ensure that there would be 9 (18) subjects in each individuals (teams) 
session, for a total of 36 (54). No subject was allowed to take part in more than one session. 
                                                                                                                                                        
protocol for individuals that would allow us to ‘listen in’ on their deliberative processes. Thirdly, in spite of 
being quite laborious to analyze, the resulting evidence would only be of an anecdotal nature in any case. 
9  The reason for this unbalanced number of observations is that we experienced a software crash at the end of 
the first individuals session, due to programming problems. Since we were subsequently able to recover the 
data from this first session essentially intact, we include it in the analysis. 
10 Refer to the supplementary material for sample screen shots. 
11  In some sessions we also completed a third repetition, which we do not report here. Since markets populated 
by individuals typically converge to intrinsic value by the third repetition (SSW; van Boening, Williams and 
LaMaster 1993), there is little scope in this setting for teams to improve on the performance of individuals. 
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Since we did not have access to the A Lab for the entire duration of the sessions, we had to 
modify our procedures relative to the team double auctions. After subjects had signed in, we 
assigned them to, and seated them in, the cubicles in the B Lab, keeping the doors open. We 
then read aloud the instructions, copies of which lay ready in the cubicles.12 There was no 
practice period, as the task of entering quantity and price offers was straightforward. When all 
individuals (teams) were ready, the doors to the cubicles were closed and the experiment 
commenced. Upon completion of the experiment, the subjects were asked to seat themselves 
in the A Lab, where they completed the post-experiment questionnaire individually. Finally, 
we paid them individually, in privacy from the others, in the adjoining office. 
4. Bubble measures 
To facilitate a formal comparison of individual and team markets, we follow previous studies 
in computing a range of well-established measures of the severity of mispriced transactions. 
These bubble measures allow us to compare our teams treatments not only against the 
‘narrow’ baseline provided by the corresponding individuals treatments, but also against the 
broader literature on SSW-style markets, since the measures normalize for differences in 
parameterization across studies. For each of the measures, which we define below, a larger 
value indicates a more pronounced price bubble.13 
Turnover (King et al. 1993) is a measure of the volume of share transactions relative to the 
number of shares on issue in the market: 
1
T
tt
Turnover q TSU  
where T is the number of trading periods, qt is the number of shares transacted in period t and 
TSU (Total Stock of Units) is the total number of shares on issue. 
Amplitude is a measure of the overall magnitude of peak-to-trough deviations in the mean 
transaction price in a period from intrinsic value. In the version of this measure defined by 
Haruvy and Noussair (2006), the maximum and minimum price deviations are evaluated 
relative to intrinsic value in the current period, such that: 
   max / min /t t t t t t t tAmplitude P f f P f f           
                                                 
12 The complete text of the instructions for the team call markets is contained in the supplementary material. 
The same experimenter (Author 2) read out the instructions in all seven call market sessions. 
13 For Average Bias, negative values indicate a negative bubble, i.e. prices below intrinsic value. 
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where tP  is the mean transaction price in period t in a double-auction market, or simply the 
market-clearing price in period t in a call market, and ft is intrinsic value in period t. A high 
value of this measure indicates large price swings relative to intrinsic value. 
Duration (Porter and Smith 1995) is defined as the length of the longest sequence of periods 
over which the difference between the (mean) transaction price and the intrinsic value 
increases consecutively from one period to the next: 
 1 1max : t t t t t m t mDuration m P f P f P f           
Average Bias (Haruvy and Noussair 2006) is a measure of the average strength and direction 
of the deviation of the (median) price in a period from intrinsic value in that period: 
 1T t ttAverage Bias P f T    
where tP  is the median transaction price in period t in a double-auction market, or simply the 
market-clearing price in period t in a call market. 
Average Dispersion (Palan 2009) measures the average absolute discrepancy between the 
(median) transaction price in a period and intrinsic value.14 It differs from Average Bias in 
that it penalizes both positive and negative deviations, where these may potentially cancel 
each other out in the expression for Average Bias. The Average Dispersion is defined as: 
1
T
t tt
Average Dispersion P f T    
Overpriced Transactions (Palan 2009) is the percentage of all transactions that occur at prices 
in excess of the maximum remaining dividend value of a share. It is defined as: 
max
1 1 1
100 tT q Tit tt i tOverpriced Transactions I q       
where Iitmax is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if Pit > ftmax (where Pit is the price of 
the ith share transacted in period t and ftmax is the maximum dividend stream that could 
possibly accrue from holding a share from period t until the end of the market), and Iitmax = 0 
otherwise. Thus under our parameters, ftmax is simply the maximum dividend realization of 60 
multiplied by the number of remaining trading periods. This measure provides a strong 
                                                 
14  A measure of Total Dispersion was introduced by Haruvy and Noussair (2006). We follow Palan (2009) in 
normalizing for the number of trading periods. 
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indication of speculative trade, since speculation is the only rationale (short of irrationality) 
that can explain why a trader would be willing to purchase shares at a price in excess of ftmax. 
Normalized Deviation (King et al. 1993) measures the aggregate absolute deviation of 
individual transaction prices from intrinsic value, normalized by the Total Stock of Units:15 
 1 1 100tT q it tt iNormalised Deviation P f TSU      
Finally, for double-auction markets only, we report the Dispersion Ratio (Palan 2009). This is 
a measure of price volatility designed to normalize for differences in the level and change 
over time in the variability of the outstanding dividend stream on a share. It is defined as: 
1
ˆ1 it
t
T P
t
f
Dispersion Ratio
T

   
where ˆ
itP
  is the sample standard deviation of transaction prices in period t, and 
tf
  is the 
population standard deviation of the remaining dividend stream on a share in period t. A 
Dispersion Ratio equal to unity thus indicates that transaction prices are on average exactly as 
variable as the dividend stream on a share. 
5. Results 
5.1 Double-auction treatments 
Figure 1 presents an initial impression of the trajectory of market prices in the team double-
auction markets, by showing the median transaction price in each trading period for each of 
the six markets. In this figure the lower, dark, stepped line represents the time path of intrinsic 
value while the upper, light, stepped line represents the maximum dividend value of a share in 
the event that it pays the highest possible dividend realization in all remaining periods. It can 
be seen that price bubbles are not completely eliminated in the teams markets: Market 3 in 
particular, and Market 6 to a lesser extent, display a bubble-and-crash pattern broadly similar 
to what is observed in previous studies. In the remaining four markets, prices briefly rise 
above intrinsic value, but the magnitude of the discrepancy is comparatively small and prices 
track intrinsic values closely over the final third of the experiment. 
                                                 
15 The reason for dividing by 100 in the expression for Normalized Deviation is to make the results of our 
study, in which the dividends are expressed as 0, 8, 28 or 60 experimental ‘cents’ comparable to earlier 
studies in which the dividends were expressed as 0.00, 0.08, 0.28 or 0.60 experimental ‘dollars’. 
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To provide an initial comparison, Figure 2 plots corresponding price trajectories for the HNP 
baseline markets. Four of the markets exhibit the bubble-and-crash pattern, and a pronounced 
‘negative bubble’ is observed in a fifth market. In only one of the markets do we observe 
prices broadly in line with intrinsic value through the middle to later stages of the experiment. 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here.] 
Table 2 reports our analysis of the summary bubble measures for the double-auction markets. 
The first two sections of the table report values of each of the measures in each of the six team 
double-auction and HNP baseline markets respectively, along with treatment means. The next 
two rows report p-values for tests of the null hypothesis of equality of central tendency 
between individual and team double-auction markets, in parametric and nonparametric tests 
respectively. The final row of the table is derived from a database of bubble measure 
observations that the second author has compiled for another paper. We report the mean 
values of each measure for all available observations in the database for which the subjects 
were inexperienced, and which conform particularly closely to the standard SSW design.16  
[Table 2 about here.] 
The mean bubble measures reported in Table 2 indicate that on average we attain smaller 
values of all but one of the eight measures in our team double auctions compared to the HNP 
baseline data. Moreover, the formal tests reported in the table confirm that with one additional 
exception, these differences are at least marginally significant in both the parametric and 
nonparametric tests.17 Although the significance levels of the individual test statistics are 
inhibited by the limited number of observations, the strength of our result is reinforced by the 
fact that it holds across a full spectrum of bubble measures that previous authors have devised 
to capture a broad range of characteristics of an experimental asset market. 
Our strongest result is for Duration: in every one of our team double auctions, we observe 
Duration less than or equal to the lowest value observed in the HNP baseline markets. The 
measure for which we clearly fail to obtain a result is Average Bias. Recall however that the 
definition of this measure allows periods of positive and negative price deviations from 
intrinsic value to cancel one another out, and that the HNP baseline data includes markets 
                                                 
16  These inexperienced baseline markets are limited to ones in which the intrinsic value of the experimental 
asset is declining over time, which employ a double-auction institution, and in which there is no short selling 
or futures market. The list of inexperienced baseline observations is itemized in the note to Table 2. 
17 The exception is Amplitude, for which we just fail to attain a conventional significance level in the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.109). 
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with both very large positive and negative deviations. By contrast, the measure of Average 
Dispersion penalizes all absolute deviations, both positive and negative. Given that we 
observe a lower Average Dispersion in our team double auctions (p = 0.063 in a t-test and 
p = 0.078 in a rank-sum test), we confirm that prices do indeed track intrinsic values more 
closely in an absolute sense in our teams markets. 
In addition to observing prices that track more closely to intrinsic value, we also observe 
lower Turnover in our team double auctions (p = 0.045 in a t-test and p = 0.055 in a rank-sum 
test). Figure 3 sheds further light on this by plotting the turnover of shares disaggregated by 
trading period, averaged over the six markets of the teams and HNP baseline markets 
respectively. It shows that the most pronounced difference in turnover is observed in the first 
period of trade. In the six HNP baseline markets each share is transacted on average 1.56 
times during the first period, compared to 0.56 times in the first period of the team double 
auctions (the difference is significant at p = 0.029 in a t-test and p = 0.055 in a rank-sum test). 
This difference in the first period is the main contributor to our finding of lower overall 
Turnover in the teams markets: while the direction of comparison indicates lower turnover 
under teams in all but one of the remaining periods, in only two periods does this attain 
statistical significance.18 We discuss these observations further below. 
[Figure 3 about here.] 
The measure of Normalized Deviation penalizes both the number of mispriced transactions 
and the (absolute) severity of mispricing, effectively combining the information from 
Turnover and Average Dispersion. Since we observe lower values for both Turnover and 
Average Dispersion in our teams treatment, it comes as no surprise that we find significantly 
lower Normalized Deviation (p = 0.030 in a t-test and p = 0.037 in a rank-sum test). 
We also observe lower price volatility under the team double auctions as measured by the 
Dispersion Ratio (p = 0.071 in a t-test and p = 0.055 in a rank-sum test). Figure 4 sheds 
further light on this result by plotting the mean of the sample standard deviation of transaction 
prices in each period for the six markets of the teams and HNP baseline treatments 
respectively. It shows that the average volatility in transaction prices in a period is lower in 
the teams markets for all but one out of fifteen trading periods.19 
                                                 
18  In period ten p = 0.049 in the t-test, but p = 0.106 in the rank-sum test. In period twelve p = 0.036 in the t-
test and p = 0.064 in the rank-sum test. 
19  When we conduct period-wise comparisons of the standard deviation of prices between the two treatments, 
we find that the difference is at least marginally significant in periods one, two, four, thirteen and fourteen. 
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[Figure 4 about here.] 
Finally, the bottom row in Table 2 shows that when compared to the average of all 
inexperienced baseline markets in the database of bubble measure observations from previous 
studies, our team double-auction markets on average yield smaller values of all six of the 
measures for which we have a base for comparison. This confirms that the mispricing that we 
observe in our team double auctions is also mild by the standards of the broader literature. 
In the context of a continuous double-auction, one potential impediment to the execution of 
trades by teams is that the two team members must first agree upon the trades that they make, 
and this takes time. It was for this reason that we elected to increase the length of each trading 
period from four minutes in the HNP baseline markets to five minutes in our team double-
auction markets. Nonetheless, it remains possible that the time needed for deliberation by 
teams might account for the lower volume of trade that we document in our team double-
auction markets. Moreover, and although this does not follow automatically, it could also be 
argued that this reduced volume might in turn account mechanically for our main finding of 
diminished mispricing in the teams markets. In our call market treatments, we address this 
concern by allowing unlimited time for deliberation in each trading period in both individual 
and teams treatments. Before turning to those results, we first explore this issue further with 
respect to the data from the double-auction treatments. 
As we pointed out in our discussion of Figure 3, our finding of lower Turnover in the team 
double auctions appears to be driven primarily by the significantly larger volume of trade in 
the first period of the HNP baseline markets. In these markets, the first trading period 
accounts for 25 percent of total share transactions. In the remaining trading periods, while the 
comparison generally points in the direction of lower volume in the team double auctions, the 
magnitude of the difference is much smaller than what we observe in the first period, and it is 
generally not statistically significant. Moreover, as can clearly be seen in Figures 1 and 2, in 
both the HNP baseline and teams treatments the median transaction price during the first 
period of trade is below intrinsic value in every market. For this reason, it seems a priori 
implausible that the considerably larger turnover that we observe in the first period of the 
HNP baseline markets would account for the greater propensity of those markets to bubble in 
later periods – when the differences in turnover are largely insignificant. 
To reinforce this point, Appendix A examines the robustness of the analysis in Table 2 to 
omitting the data from the first period. For each market, we recalculate each of our bubble 
measures using the data from periods two through fifteen only. An inspection of the treatment 
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means indicates that each of the measures is on average smaller in the teams markets. Turning 
to the significance tests, we find that the difference in Turnover is only marginally significant 
in the t-test (p = 0.079), while it is insignificant in the rank-sum test (p = 0.262). Our results 
for the remaining measures are largely unaffected. The only notable change is that the effect 
for Normalized Deviation drops to marginal significance. Since this measure incorporates 
turnover information by design, that is to be expected. Thus when the abnormal volumes in 
the first period are set aside, we continue to observe significant differences in mispricing even 
under conditions in which the turnover by individuals and teams is comparable.  
5.2 Call market treatments 
Figures 5 and 6 present the trajectories of market prices in the team and individual call 
markets respectively. We again observe that price bubbles are much less pronounced in the 
teams treatment. In the individuals treatment, all markets exhibit pronounced bubbles, with 
the exception of the experienced repetition in Market 4. In two of the inexperienced 
individuals markets, we observe prices in excess of the maximum possible remaining 
dividend value. In the experienced repetition of individuals Market 1, this is the case in 7 out 
of 15 periods. By contrast, we never observe prices in excess of maximum dividend value in 
any of the teams markets, in either the inexperienced or once-experienced repetitions. 
[Figures 5 and 6 about here.] 
Table 3 reports our analysis of the summary bubble measures for the call market treatments. 
The first two sections of the table report values of each of the measures in each of the three 
team (four individual) inexperienced call markets, along with treatment means.20 The next 
two sections report the corresponding data for once-experienced markets. Because of the 
limited number of observations in the call market treatments, we do not report formal 
significance tests of the treatment differences. Nonetheless, the results reported in Table 3 are 
striking. The individual call markets yield larger average bubble measures in 13 out of 14 
instances (7 measures for each of the inexperienced and once-experienced conditions). 
[Table 3 about here.] 
The one exception is Turnover in inexperienced markets, which is indistinguishable between 
individual and team markets. This further reinforces our conclusion in Section 5.1 that 
                                                 
20  We do not report the Dispersion Ratio measure of price volatility for the call market treatments, since it is 
by definition equal to zero in all markets under this institution. 
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differences in Turnover are not responsible for the differences in mispricing that we report 
between individual and team markets under the double-auction institution. Once again, we 
find that these differences in mispricing persist even under conditions in which share turnover 
is comparable between individual and team markets. 
Furthermore, the average bubble measures for our team call markets are in every instance 
smaller than the corresponding average from a broad database of call market bubble measures 
from previous studies, in a pairwise comparison of markets of the same experience level. 
These averages are reported in the final two rows of Table 3, and the list of call market 
observations is itemized in the note to that table. By contrast, for our individual call markets 
only 2 of the 6 mean bubble measures are smaller than the corresponding database averages, 
in both inexperienced and once-experienced markets. 
Thus the results of our call market treatments strongly reinforce our findings from the double-
auction treatments. They establish, firstly, that differences in mispricing persist even when 
both individuals and teams are allowed unlimited time for deliberation, secondly, that these 
differences persist with experience, and thirdly, that they are robust to the market institution. 
5.3 Subject pool analysis 
A concern raised by a referee relates to the large number of Economics and Business majors 
who participated in the team double-auction sessions. Although subjects in all treatments 
were recruited from the same population using comparable procedures, it is possible that – as 
a result of random sampling variation – the set of subjects assigned to one treatment might not 
be representative of the broader subject population, or might differ in some salient respect 
from the subjects assigned to another treatment. To shed further light on this, in the 
supplementary material we report an analysis of observable subject characteristics in the 
individual and team treatments for both the double-auction and call market treatments. 
We find no significant differences between individual and team subjects with respect to any 
observable demographic characteristics. However with respect to Economics and Business 
majors, our findings are mixed. In the double-auction treatments, we indeed find that the 
proportion of these majors is significantly larger in the teams markets compared to the HNP 
baseline. Yet in our call markets, we obtain a significant difference in the opposite direction. 
Therefore, if it is subjects’ knowledge of Economics and Business that is responsible for their 
reduced propensity to bubble, then in our call market treatments we should observe smaller 
price bubbles in the individuals condition. As we have seen, this is not the case: in our call 
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market treatments, we again find that mispricing is diminished in markets that are populated 
by teams. In short, there is no consistent association between the proportion of Economics and 
Business majors and the direction of our treatment effects across the two market institutions. 
In retrospect, we do not find this result surprising. As we observed in our literature review, 
the few previous studies to examine the effect of subjects’ knowledge of business upon their 
propensity to bubble and crash all find no effect when subjects are inexperienced. In light of 
these findings, as well as our own subject pool analysis, we conclude that it is implausible to 
attribute our finding of diminished mispricing in team markets to the proportion of subjects 
who were Economics and Business majors. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of team decision-making in an asset market experiment 
that has long been known to reliably generate price bubbles and crashes in markets populated 
by individuals. We find that this phenomenon is substantially diminished when each decision-
making unit is instead a team of two. This is the case, as measured by a full range of measures 
of the severity of mispricing, both under a continuous double-auction institution as well as a 
call market. The result holds even when there is unlimited time for deliberation, and when the 
subjects are experienced. It also holds not only when teams are compared to the ‘narrow’ 
baseline provided by the corresponding individuals treatments, but also when compared more 
broadly to the results of the large body of previous research on markets of this kind. 
In designing our study, we sought to give any effect of team decision-making the greatest 
opportunity to express itself by maximizing the team interaction. To this end, we allowed 
teams to communicate in the most natural way possible, choosing a protocol of direct, face-to-
face interaction, over alternatives such as computer chat or simple voting protocols. We 
believe that this freedom of communication also more closely reflects the most common type 
of team interaction in a business context. At the same time, it involves a tradeoff in that we 
relinquish control over how team decisions are formed and thus the exact mechanisms by 
which the teams attain superior outcomes. Thus while we succeed in our original research 
objective of documenting an effect of team decision-making in a market setting, it remains an 
open question for future research to determine precisely how and why this effect occurs. 
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Fig. 1 Median price trajectories in team double-auction markets. The black step-wise decreasing function 
shows the remaining expected dividend holding value of a share, the grey step-wise decreasing function shows 
the remaining maximum possible dividend return from one share. 
 
Fig. 2 Median price trajectories in HNP baseline (individual double-auction) markets. The black step-wise 
decreasing function shows the remaining expected dividend holding value of a share, the grey step-wise 
decreasing function shows the remaining maximum possible dividend return from one share. 
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Fig. 3  Turnover of shares by trading period in double-auction treatments, treatment means. The vertical axis 
measures the average number of times that each share is transacted in each period. The percentage of the total 
turnover that takes place in each period is noted above (below) the line for the HNP baseline (teams) treatment. 
 
Fig. 4 Standard deviation of period transaction prices in double-auction treatments, treatment means. 
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Fig. 5 Market price trajectories in team call markets. The black step-wise decreasing function shows the 
remaining expected dividend holding value of a share, the grey step-wise decreasing function shows the 
remaining maximum possible dividend return from one share. 
 
Fig. 6 Market price trajectories in individual call markets. The black step-wise decreasing function shows the 
remaining expected dividend holding value of a share, the grey step-wise decreasing function shows the 
remaining maximum possible dividend return from one share. 
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Table 1 Summary demographic and earnings data. 
 HNP baseline(n=51) 
Team 
double auction
(n=108) 
Individual 
call markets 
(n=36) 
Team 
call markets 
(n=54) 
Average age (years) n/a a 22.7 23.0 22.8 
Female (%) 52.9 58.9 44.4 46.3 
Economics or Business majors (%) 64.7 85.2 77.8 55.6 
Average earnings EUR 28.45 (USD 36.63) 
EUR 29.15 
(USD 37.53) 
EUR 30.66 
(USD 39.47) 
EUR 25.24 
(USD 32.49) 
Range of earnings b EUR 0.1–122.5 EUR 9.3–109.6 c EUR 15.9–63.8 EUR 13.8–37.9
Standard deviation of earnings EUR 30.57 EUR 16.42 EUR 9.85 EUR 4.92 
a n/a indicates that data are not available for the HNP baseline condition because the relevant item was not 
included in their questionnaire. 
b Earnings for the call market treatments are reported as the total for two market repetitions 
c These figures exclude an experimenter error that resulted in subjects in one session receiving excess payments 
(which they only learned of after the experiment had concluded). 
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Table 2 Bubble measures in double-auction treatments. 
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Team double-auction markets 
Session 1 5.17 1.09 7 −45.20 72.27 0.00 7.11 0.17 
Session 2 4.17 0.76 7 −5.57 40.83 0.00 2.73 0.25 
Session 3 5.31 3.15 6 57.57 145.90 9.95 9.69 0.58 
Session 4 3.22 1.12 7 1.80 49.40 0.00 1.79 0.15 
Session 5 1.11 0.84 7 10.18 31.27 0.00 0.44 0.14 
Session 6 3.03 2.27 7 73.30 87.23 8.26 2.05 0.32 
Treatment Average 3.67 1.54 6.83 15.35 71.15 3.03 3.97 0.27 
HNP baseline (individual double-auction) markets 
Session 1 6.38 0.91 10 −60.47 61.53 0.00 7.62 0.39 
Session 2 6.56 4.30 7 153.13 281.93 12.11 18.13 2.02 
Session 3 11.25 1.21 13 −125.23 126.97 0.00 19.03 0.24 
Session 4 4.31 3.94 7 33.80 84.33 21.29 5.89 0.83 
Session 5 5.50 3.54 9 19.57 170.50 18.69 10.37 0.52 
Session 6 3.19 2.22 9 57.50 87.37 11.76 3.18 0.45 
Treatment Average 6.20 2.69 9.17 13.05 135.44 10.64 10.70 0.74 
t-test, unequal variances 
(one-sided p-values) 0.045
** 0.070* 0.025** 0.520 0.063* 0.054* 0.030** 0.071* 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
(p-value) 0.055
* 0.109 0.020** 1.000 0.078* 0.087* 0.037** 0.055* 
All inexperienced baseline 
markets in database 
(no. of markets) 
5.66 
(41) 
2.85 
(5) 
8.47 
(22) 
95.22 
(8) 
125.18
(8) 
n/a 
(0) 
6.60 
(18) 
n/a 
(0) 
*/** denotes significance at the 0.1/0.05-level respectively. For t-tests, we report one-sided p-values for the null 
hypothesis that the mean under the individuals treatment is no further from zero. The entries in the bottom row 
are derived from a database of bubble measure observations compiled for publication by the second author. The 
set of observations included in the inexperienced baseline classification are derived from Davies (2006): 
Decreasing fundamental value treatments, Annex 4, pp. 31–33; Haruvy and Noussair (2006): NSS treatments, 
Table II, p. 1132; King et al. (1993): Inexperienced baseline treatment, Table 13.1, p. 185; Porter and Smith 
(1994): Baseline treatment, Table 2, p. 116; Porter and Smith (1995): Baseline treatment, Table 5, p. 521; Smith, 
Van Boening and Wellford (2000): Markets A2-1 to A2-6, Appendix Table 1, p. 582; and SSW (1988): 
Experiments 26 and 41, Table 1, p. 1126 and Figure 7, p. 1131. 
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Table 3 Bubble measures in call market treatments. 
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Team call markets, Inexperienced subjects 
Session 1 1.75 1.00 3.00 −24.54 39.15 0.00 1.09 
Session 2 2.03 1.94 7.00 −12.79 97.64 0.00 2.15 
Session 3 1.69 1.41 8.00 −1.92 71.15 0.00 1.51 
Treatment Average 1.82 1.45 6.00 −13.08 69.32 0.00 1.58 
Individual call markets, Inexperienced subjects 
Session 1a 1.79 16.52 12.00 115.57 215.29 27.69 3.27 
Session 2 1.78 1.94 5.00 46.85 86.54 0.00 1.02 
Session 3 1.36 4.08 11.00 −41.20 161.20 34.69 2.05 
Session 4 2.33 1.22 10.00 29.87 51.20 0.00 1.11 
Treatment Average 1.81 5.94 9.50 37.77 128.56 15.60 1.86 
Team call markets, Once-experienced subjects 
Session 1 0.72 0.39 3.00 6.56 6.56 0.00 0.05 
Session 2 1.78 1.17 3.00 45.38 46.92 0.00 0.65 
Session 3 1.19 0.50 2.00 17.90 20.70 0.00 0.22 
Treatment Average 1.23 0.69 2.67 23.28 24.73 0.00 0.31 
Individual call markets, Once-experienced subjects 
Session 1a 1.32 5.19 10.00 224.93 244.80 29.17 2.80 
Session 2 1.36 0.87 3.00 51.85 51.85 0.00 0.41 
Session 3 1.19 1.68 5.00 37.08 90.08 0.00 1.11 
Session 4 3.14 0.16 3.00 5.47 7.20 0.00 0.19 
Treatment Average 1.75 1.97 5.25 79.83 98.48 7.29 1.12 
All inexperienced call markets 
in database (no. of markets) 
2.48
(27) 
3.55
(50) 
6.97
(63) 
6.88 
(50) 
99.12 
(50) 
n/a 
(0) 
2.90 
(8) 
All once-experienced call markets 
in database (no. of markets) 
1.81
(21) 
2.87
(6) 
5.84
(13) 
43.41 
(6) 
73.46 
(6) 
n/a 
(0) 
1.24 
(8) 
The entries in the bottom two rows are derived from a database of bubble measure observations compiled for 
publication by the second author. The set of observations included in the inexperienced call market classification 
are derived from Caginalp, Porter and Smith (1998): Table 1, p. 758 (The fact that a call auction institution was 
used is taken from Caginalp, Porter and Smith (2001), p. 82, and was confirmed in private communication by 
Dave Porter.); Caginalp, Porter and Smith (2001): Tables 1a–1c, pp. 84–85, and Table 2, p. 90; Haruvy, Lahav 
and Noussair (2007): Table 2, p. 1908; Hussam, Porter and Smith (2008): Table 4, p. 934; and Van Boening, 
Williams and LaMaster (1993): Table 1, p. 181. The set of observations included in the once experienced call 
market classification are derived from Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair (2007); Hussam, Porter and Smith (2008); 
and Van Boening, Williams and LaMaster (1993); using the same detailed references as before. 
a Programming errors led to the creation of one extra share after period 8 of the inexperienced market, and three 
extra shares after period 14 of the experienced market. The bubble measures were adjusted to reflect these 
changes in the number of shares. 
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Appendix A Re-analysis of bubble measures for double auctions, excluding data from the first period. 
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Team double-auction markets 
Session 1 4.14 1.05 6 −29.86 58.86 0.00 4.43 0.17 
Session 2 3.25 0.62 6 5.46 32.32 0.00 1.38 0.21 
Session 3 4.72 3.10 5 80.96 137.04 11.18 8.10 0.58 
Session 4 2.83 0.88 6 16.21 38.64 0.00 1.00 0.10 
Session 5 0.92 0.84 7 12.20 33.40 0.00 0.38 0.13 
Session 6 2.75 2.27 7 83.25 88.75 9.09 1.77 0.28 
Treatment Average 3.10 1.46 6.17 28.04 64.83 3.38 2.84 0.24 
HNP baseline (individual double-auction) markets 
Session 1 4.62 0.55 9 −43.36 44.50 0.00 2.46 0.37 
Session 2 4.03 4.22 6 187.64 278.50 19.71 10.01 2.15 
Session 3 8.42 1.21 13 −112.75 114.61 0.00 12.06 0.15 
Session 4 3.11 3.59 7 58.36 68.21 28.57 2.68 0.71 
Session 5 4.97 3.51 8 39.54 164.11 20.67 9.07 0.51 
Session 6 2.69 2.22 9 62.32 92.89 13.95 2.46 0.35 
Treatment Average 4.64 2.55 8.67 31.96 127.14 13.82 6.46 0.71 
t-test, unequal variances 
(one-sided p-values) 0.079
* 0.083* 0.026** 0.467 0.074* 0.043** 0.065* 0.093* 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
(p-value) 0.262 0.200 0.026
** 1.000 0.078* 0.087* 0.055* 0.078* 
*/** denotes significance at the 0.1/0.05-level respectively. For t-tests, we report one-sided p-values for the null 
hypothesis that the mean under the individuals treatment is no further from zero. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TEAM DOUBLE-AUCTION TREATMENT 
1. General Instructions 
This is an experiment on decision making in a market. The instructions are simple and if you follow them 
carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you 
in cash at the end of the experiment. The experiment consists of a sequence of trading Periods in which you will 
have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market. The currency used in the market is francs. All trading will be 
done in terms of francs. The cash payment to you at the end of the experiment will be in euros. The conversion 
rate is: 100 francs to 1 Euro. 
2. How to use the Computerized Market  
In the top right hand corner of the screen you see how much time is left in the current trading Period. The goods 
that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. In the center of your screen you see the number of 
Shares you currently have and the amount of Money you have available to buy Shares.  
If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled “Enter offer to sell” in the first column. In that 
text area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell a share, and then select “Submit Offer To 
Sell”. Please do so now. Type in a number in the appropriate space, and then click on the field labeled “Submit 
Offer To Sell”. You will notice that eighteen numbers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the 
second column from the left, entitled “Offers To Sell”. Your offer is listed in blue. Submitting a second offer 
will replace your previous offer. 
The lowest offer-to-sell price will always be on the bottom of that list. You can select an offer by clicking on it. 
It will then be highlighted. If you select “Buy”, the button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one share 
for the currently selected sell price. Please purchase a share now by selecting an offer and clicking the “Buy” 
button. Since each of you had offered to sell a share and attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you all 
have the same number of shares you started out with. This is because you bought one share and sold one share. 
Please note that if you have an offer selected and the offer gets changed, it will become deselected if the offer 
became worse for you. If the offer gets better, it will remain selected. 
When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase. When you sell a share your Money 
increases by the price of the sale. You may make an offer to buy a unit by selecting “Submit offer to buy.” 
Please do so now. Type a number in the text area “Enter offer to buy”, then press the red button labeled “Submit 
Offer To Buy”. You can replace your offer-to-buy by submitting a new offer. You can accept any of the offers-
to-buy by selecting the offer and then clicking on the “Sell” button. Please do so now.  
In the middle column, labeled “Transaction Prices”, you can see the prices at which Shares have been bought 
and sold in this period. You will now have about 10 minutes to buy and sell shares. This is a practice period. 
Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not influence your position later in 
the experiment. The only goal of the practice period is to master the use of the interface. Please be sure that you 
have successfully submitted offers to buy and offers to sell. Also be sure that you have accepted buy and sell 
offers. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come by and assist you. 
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3. Specific Instructions for this Experiment 
In this experiment you will be randomly paired with a partner, with whom you will be making decisions jointly 
as a team of two. It is important that both you and your partner agree on each of the decisions you make over the 
course of the experiment, as they may influence the earnings that you both receive at the conclusion of the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment both you and your partner will each receive the total value of your 
team’s cash balance, converted into Euros at the conversion rate specified at the beginning of these 
instructions. 
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods. In each period, there will be a market open for 5 minutes, in 
which your team may buy and sell shares. Shares are assets with a life of 15 periods, and your team’s inventory 
of shares carries over from one trading period to the next. Your team may receive dividends for each share in its 
inventory at the end of each of the 15 trading periods.  
At the end of each trading period, including period 15, the computer will randomly determine the dividend value 
for all shares in that period. Each period, each share your team holds at the end of the period: 
 earns a dividend of 0 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
 earns a dividend of 8 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
 earns a dividend of 28 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
 earns a dividend of 60 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
Each of the four dividend values is equally likely, thus the average dividend in each period is 24. Dividends are 
added to your team’s cash balance automatically. 
After the dividend is paid at the end of period 15, there will be no further earnings possible from shares. 
4. Average Holding Value Table 
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE to help you make decisions. There are 5 columns 
in the table. The first column, labeled Ending Period, indicates the last trading period of the experiment. The 
second column, labeled Current Period, indicates the period during which the average holding value is being 
calculated. The third column gives the number of holding periods from the period in the second column until the 
end of the experiment. The fourth column, labeled Average Dividend per Period, gives the average amount that 
the dividend will be in each period for each unit held in your team’s inventory. The fifth column, labeled 
Average Holding Value Per Unit of Inventory, gives the average value for each unit held in your team’s 
inventory from now until the end of the experiment. That is, for each share your team holds for the remainder of 
the experiment, both you and your partner will each earn on average the amount listed in column 5.  
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining. Since the dividend on a Share has a 25% chance of 
being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 28 and a 25% chance of being 60 in any period, the 
dividend is on average 24 per period for each Share. If your team holds a Share for the remaining 7 periods, the 
total dividend for the Share over the 7 periods is on average 7 × 24 = 168. Therefore, the total value of holding a 
Share over the 7 periods is on average 168. 
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AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE 
Ending 
Period 
Current 
Period 
Number of 
Holding Periods ×
Average Dividend
Per Period =
Average Holding Value  
Per Share in Inventory 
15 1 15 24 360 
15 2 14 24 336 
15 3 13 24 312 
15 4 12 24 288 
15 5 11 24 264 
15 6 10 24 240 
15 7 9 24 216 
15 8 8 24 192 
15 9 7 24 168 
15 10 6 24 144 
15 11 5 24 120 
15 12 4 24 96 
15 13 3 24 72 
15 14 2 24 48 
15 15 1 24 24 
5. Your Earnings 
Your earnings for the entire experiment will equal the amount of cash that your team has at the end of period 15, 
after the last dividend has been paid. The amount of cash you will have is equal to:  
The cash (called “Money” on your screen) your team has at the beginning of the experiment  
+ dividends your team receives  
+ money received by your team from sales of shares 
– money spent by your team on purchases of shares 
Both you and your partner will each receive the total value of this cash balance, converted into Euros at the 
conversion rate specified at the beginning of these instructions. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TEAM CALL MARKET TREATMENT 
1. General instructions 
This is an experiment on decision making in a market. The instructions are simple and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will 
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The experiment consists of two sequences of 
fifteen periods in which you have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market. The money used in this 
market is called francs. All buying and selling will be done in francs. The cash payment to you at the 
end of the experiment will be in Euros. 
The conversion rate is: 260 francs to 1 Euro. 
2. How to use the computerized market  
In each period, you will see a computer screen like the one shown below. The items that you can buy 
and sell in the market are called shares. In the top left corner of your screen you will see the number 
of shares you currently have and the amount of money you have available. 
 If you would like to buy shares, you can submit a buy order. Your buy order indicates the 
number of shares you would like to buy and the highest price that you are willing to pay for 
each share that you buy.  
 If you would like to sell shares, you can submit a sell order. Your sell order indicates the 
number of shares you would like to sell and the lowest price that you are willing to accept for 
each share that you sell.  
In each period, you may submit both a buy order and a sell order. The price at which you offer to buy 
must be less than the price at which you offer to sell. The price that you specify in your order is a per-
unit price, at which you are willing to buy or sell each share. 
 
Once you click on the OK button, your buy and sell orders for this period are final and can no longer 
be revised. The period will end after everyone has clicked OK. 
The computer will then organize the buy and sell orders and use them to determine the market price 
at which shares will be bought and sold in this period. All transactions in the period will occur at the 
market price. This will generally be a price such that the number of shares with sell order prices at or 
below this price is equal to the number of shares with buy order prices at or above this price. Those 
who submit buy orders at prices above the market price will make purchases, and those who submit 
sell orders at prices below the market price will make sales. 
At the end of each period you will see a results screen. This screen will show the market price, the 
value of any dividends you earned, and your new balance of money and shares. When you have 
finished reading this information, please click on the Continue button. 
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3. Specific instructions for this experiment 
In this experiment you will be randomly paired with a partner, with whom you will make decisions 
jointly as a team of two. It is important that both you and your partner agree on each of the decisions 
you make, as they will affect the earnings that you both receive from the experiment. At the end of 
the experiment both you and your partner will each receive the total value of your team’s money 
balance, converted into Euros at the rate specified at the beginning of these instructions. 
The experiment will consist of three sequences of fifteen periods. In each period, there will be a 
market, operating under the rules explained above, in which your team may buy and sell shares. 
Shares are assets with a life of fifteen periods, and the shares that your team holds will carry over 
from one period to the next within each fifteen-period sequence. 
Your team may receive dividends for each share that it holds at the end of each period. At the end of 
each period, including period fifteen, the computer will randomly determine the dividend for all 
shares in that period. In each period, each share that your team holds at the end of that period will pay: 
 a dividend of 0 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
 a dividend of 8 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
 a dividend of 28 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
 a dividend of 60 francs for both you and your partner with probability 1/4 
Since each of the four dividend values is equally likely, the average dividend for each share in each 
period is 24 francs. Dividends will be added to your team’s money balance automatically after each 
period. After the dividend has been paid at the end of period fifteen, the sequence ends and there are 
no further earnings possible from shares. 
After the first sequence of fifteen periods has finished, a second sequence will begin. The amount of 
money and shares that your team has at the beginning of the second sequence will be the same as what 
it was at the beginning of the first one. The same goes for the third sequence of fifteen periods. 
4. Average Holding Value Table 
You can use the Average Holding Value Table to help make decisions. It indicates how much, on 
average, each share will pay in dividends if it is held until the end of the fifteenth period. 
The first column shows the ending period of the sequence. The second column shows the current 
period for which the average holding value is being calculated. The third column shows the number of 
holding periods from the current period to the ending period. The fourth column shows the average 
dividend per period for each share that your team holds. The fifth column shows the average holding 
value per share that your team holds from the current period until the end of the fifteenth period. 
That is, for each share that your team holds until the end of period fifteen, both you and your partner 
will each earn on average the amount shown in column five. The value in column five is calculated by 
multiplying the values in columns three and four. 
5. Your Earnings 
Both you and your partner will be paid for your decisions in both sequences of fifteen periods. In each 
sequence you will each earn the total amount of money that your team has at the end of period fifteen, 
after the last dividend has been paid. This will be equal to:  
The money your team had at the start of period one 
+ Dividends your team received 
+ Money your team received from sales of shares 
− Money your team spent on purchases of shares 
At the conclusion of the experiment, both you and your partner will each receive in cash the total 
value of this money balance, converted into Euros at the rate specified on page one of the instructions. 
9 
AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE 
Ending 
Period 
Current 
Period 
Number of 
Holding Periods ×
Average Dividend
Per Period =
Average Holding 
Value Per Share  
15 1 15 24 360 
15 2 14 24 336 
15 3 13 24 312 
15 4 12 24 288 
15 5 11 24 264 
15 6 10 24 240 
15 7 9 24 216 
15 8 8 24 192 
15 9 7 24 168 
15 10 6 24 144 
15 11 5 24 120 
15 12 4 24 96 
15 13 3 24 72 
15 14 2 24 48 
15 15 1 24 24 
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POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TEAMS TREATMENTS 
Team-ID: 
Are you: 
[0. female; 1. male] 
Your age: 
Are you a: 
[0. domestic student; 1. international student] 
Your native language: 
[0. Dutch; 1. other (please specify)] 
In what level of degree program are you currently enrolled? 
[0. Bachelor’s; 1. Master’s; 2. M.Phil; 3. PhD; 4. other (please specify)] 
What is your current year of enrolment in this degree? 
What is your major field of study? 
What is your annual income in Euro? (Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest and 
dividend payments, scholarship support, student loans, parental support, social security, alimony, child support 
and others.) 
[0. Less than 7,500; 1. 7,501 to 12,500; 2. 12,501 to 17,500; 3. 17,501 to 22,500; 4.More than 22,500] 
What is the combined annual income of yourself and all of your family members who live with you at the same 
residence in Euro? (Consider all forms of income as defined above.) 
[0. Less than 20,000; 1. 20,001 to 40,000; 2. 40,001 to 60,000; 3. 60,001 to 80,000; 4. More than 
80,000] 
What was your strategy during the experiment? 
Do you believe that you acted rationally and that you maximized your profit? 
[0. Do not agree at all; through to 4. Agree completely] 
Did you ever make a mistake in entering a price, or clicked a wrong button? If so, please tell us exactly what 
went wrong and in what period! 
Out of the 9 teams, which rank do you think your team has attained with regard to your earnings (“1” signifying 
the best, “9” the worst result)? 
Do you think your decisions were better or worse than if you had had to reach your decisions alone? 
[0. Much worse than alone; through to 4. Much better than alone] 
How much did you contribute to the joint decision? 
[0. 0%; through to 10. 100%] 
Was it easy for you to come to a joint decision? 
[0. Not at all easy; through to 4. Very easy] 
How did you solve conflicts if you could not agree? 
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Financial Literacy Questions (All treatments except HNP baseline) 
Suppose you had €100 in a savings account and the interest rate is 20% per year and you never withdraw money or 
interest payments. After 5 years, how much would you have on this account in total? 
 More than €200; 
 Exactly €200; 
 Less than €200; 
 Do not know. 
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 
year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account? 
 More than today; 
 Exactly the same; 
 Less than today; 
 Do not know. 
Suppose that in the year 2010, your income has doubled and prices of all goods have doubled too. In 2010, how 
much will you be able to buy with your income? 
 More than today; 
 The same; 
 Less than today; 
 Do not know. 
Which of the following statements describes the main function of the stock market? 
 The stock market helps to predict stock earnings; 
 The stock market results in an increase in the price of stocks; 
 The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together with those who want to sell stocks; 
 None of the above; 
 Do not know. 
Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys the stock of firm B in the stock market: 
 He owns a part of firm B; 
 He has lent money to firm B; 
 He is liable for firm B’s debts; 
 None of the above; 
 Do not know. 
Which of the following statements is correct? 
 Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first year; 
 Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and bonds; 
 Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past performance; 
 None of the above; 
 Do not know. 
Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys a bond of firm B: 
 He owns a part of firm B; 
 He has lent money to firm B; 
 He is liable for firm B’s debts; 
 None of the above; 
 Do not know. 
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Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which asset normally gives the highest return? 
 Savings accounts; 
 Bonds; 
 Stocks; 
 Do not know. 
Normally, which asset displays the highest fluctuations over time? 
 Savings accounts; 
 Bonds; 
 Stocks; 
 Do not know. 
When an investor spreads his money among different assets, does the risk of losing money: 
 Increase; 
 Decrease; 
 Stay the same; 
 Do not know. 
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DETAILED SUBJECT POOL ANALYSIS 
Table S.1 reports summary statistics of the observable demographic characteristics of the subjects, 
disaggregated by treatments. For age, financial literacy and income, data are not available for the 
HNP baseline treatment because these items were not included in their questionnaire. The final two 
columns of the table report p-values for Fisher exact tests of the association between the respective 
characteristics and the assignment of subjects to, respectively, the HNP baseline vs. team double 
auction and individual vs. team call market treatments. 
In the two double-auction treatments, we find that there are no significant differences between the 
subject pools with regard to gender and international student status. This is again the case for the two 
call market treatments. For the call market treatments, we also find no significant differences with 
respect to age, financial literacy, and personal or family income. (We are unable to report the latter 
comparisons for the double auctions because the data are not available from the HNP questionnaire.) 
We turn next to the specific issue of Business and/or Economics majors vs. all other majors. The 
relevant results are reported in the bottom three rows of Table S.1. If greater knowledge of Business 
and/or Economics were responsible for the diminution of price bubbles that we observe, there should 
be a larger fraction of Business and/or Economics majors in the two treatments in which we observe 
smaller bubbles, i.e. the team double-auction markets (vs. the HNP baseline) and team call markets 
(vs. individual call markets). This is not the case. In particular, the fraction of Business majors cannot 
explain our results, since there is a (not significantly) larger fraction of Business majors in both the 
HNP baseline and individual call market treatments. This would imply that a larger fraction of 
Business majors is associated with larger bubbles, which runs counter to intuition. Similarly, the 
proportion of Economics majors also cannot explain our results, since there are more Economics 
majors in the team double-auction sessions (which produce smaller bubbles than the HNP baseline) 
and also more Economics majors in the individual call markets (which exhibit larger bubbles than the 
team call markets). Finally, when the Business and Economics majors are pooled, the findings mirror 
those for the Economics majors alone. 
On the basis of this analysis, we conclude that there are no significant differences between individual 
and team subjects with respect to any observable demographic characteristics. We also conclude that 
there is no consistent association between the proportion of subjects who are Business and Economics 
majors and the direction of our treatment effects across the two market institutions. 
Prompted by a query from a referee, we also searched for subject pool differences within the team 
double-auction treatment that might account for the comparatively large price bubbles in markets 3 
and 6 (relative to the other markets in the same treatment). However, we found no significant 
differences with regard to age, team gender composition, nationality, financial literacy, personal or 
family income, or major in markets 3 and 6 compared to markets 1, 2, 4 and 5. 
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TABLE S.1: SUBJECT POOL COMPARISON 
 
(1) 
HNP 
baseline 
(n=51) 
(2) 
Team double 
auction 
(n=108) 
(3) 
Individual call 
markets 
(n=36) 
(4) 
Team call 
markets 
(n=54) 
(1) 
vs. 
(2) 
(3) 
vs. 
(4) 
Age (years) n/a 22.7 23.0 22.8 n/a 0.812 
Female (%) 52.9 58.9 44.4 46.3 0.497 1.000 
International (%) 80.4 81.5 83.3 79.6 0.917 0.662 
Financial Literacy n/a 7.71 7.22 7.43 n/a 0.694 
Personal income 
(categorical) n/a 
75/37/ 
11/2/1 
23/10/ 
3/0/0 
30/18/ 
6/0/0 n/a 0.429 
Family income 
(categorical) n/a 
58/22/ 
13/9/6 
19/6/ 
6/3/1 
27/12/ 
6/5/3 n/a 0.802 
Business 45.1% 37.0% 36.1% 35.2% 0.386 1.000 
Economics 19.6% 48.1% 41.7% 20.4% 0.001*** 0.035**
Economics or 
Business 64.7% 85.2% 77.8% 55.6% 0.006
*** 0.043**
Columns 2 to 5 report summary statistics for the subject pools, by treatment. n/a indicates that data are not 
available for the HNP baseline condition because the relevant item was not included in their questionnaire. Row 
1 reports the average age of the subjects in years, row 2 reports the percentage who are female, row 3 reports the 
percentage who are international students, and row 4 reports the average score on a ten-item test of financial 
literacy. Row 5 reports the distribution of responses to a measure of personal income elicited on the following 
ordinal scale: 0 [<  € 7500], 1 [€ 7501–€ 12500], 2 [€ 12501–€ 17500], 3 [€ 17501–€ 22500] and 4 [> € 22500]. 
Row 6 reports the distribution of responses to a measure of family income elicited on the following ordinal 
scale: 0 [<  € 20000], 1 [€ 20001–€ 40000], 2 [€ 40001–€ 60000], 3 [€ 60001–€ 80000] and 4 [> € 80000]. 
Columns 6 and 7 report two-sided p-values from Fisher exact tests of the association between the respective 
characteristics and the assignment of subjects to the individuals and teams treatments. **/*** denotes significance 
at the 0.05/0.01-level respectively. 
 
